This article studies the constitutional features of Afghan presidential elections and their impact on coalition-building. Based on the constitution, Afghan presidential elections are candidate-centric, zero-sum games, prone to pre-electoral bargaining, majoritarianism, double ballots, are religiously exclusive, and constrained by electoral cycles, as well as presidential term limits. Examining the presidential electoral features, this article argues that they do not have unidirectional impacts on coalition-building: some electoral features incentivize the formation of cross-ethnic coalitions, while others hinder their institutionalization. Therefore, while some function as constructive features, others are obstructive to coalition-building. This article proposes that the obstructive features of presidential elections can be remedied through institutional designs. The remedies proposed in this article include holding concurrent elections and adopting nomination thresholds. By Dr. Mohammad Bashir Mobashir
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